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EVE SEDGWICK, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND PERVERSION
KATHERINE M. FRANKE*
It is hard to imagine where queer theory would be without Eve
Sedgwick. Indeed, I can't imagine where my own thinking would be had it
not been informed, enriched, challenged, repulsed, and seduced by
Sedgwick's writing. Between Men: English Literature and Male
Homosocial Desire' and The Epistemology of the Closet,2 the early work,
gave me the tools to think about the fundamental landscapes of my intellec-
tual world in ways that decoupled and reconfigured the binaries of male/
female, heterosexual/homosexual, friend/lover, and public/private.
Sedgwick gave us the idea of homosociality and a critique of identity and
identification that exploded the male/female and homo/hetero divide. From
that point forward our previous work undertaken without the benefit of these
ideas seemed pathetically naive and, well, modernist (not that!) for their
absence.
Stopping myself from lapsing into the bromides of hagiography, I'll
resist elaborating further on the debt I owe to Eve Sedgwick's intellectual
estate, except to offer some thoughts on her short essay, A Poem is Being
Written,3 when held up against Freud's important tract on female psychic
development, A Child Is Being Beaten.
4
As a lawyer and law professor, I must confess great delight in returning
to Freud's A Child Is Being Beaten, even though it is a la mode to mock
Freud's rigid, structural approach to psychic development in which the father
figures, somehow inevitably, as the hero in every story. In so many familiar
ways, A Child Is Being Beaten reads like a legal text. Its rigid formalism, its
three-part structure, and its master narrative in which law-the law of the
father, which produces the Oedipal complex-is used to explain and give
order to the problem at hand. This approach struck me as a kind of adjudica-
tion of female disorder that is methodologically familiar turf to a lawyer.
Freud's essay recounts the diagnosis and treatment of a female patient
who suffers from sexual neurosis, which he traces back to childhood sexual
* Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Gender and Sexuality Law, Colum-
bia Law School © 2009 by Katherine M. Franke. All rights reserved. I want to thank
Janet Halley and Jeannie Suk for inviting a group of us to read these two texts together
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fantasies of being beaten by her father. Hence the title A Child is Being
Beaten. Often criticized for being too phallic and male-centered in his
clinical and theoretical work, in this essay Freud foregrounds the develop-
ment of girls and uses this case as an opportunity to offer an extended dis-
cussion of the difference between the beating fantasies of boys and girls.
The essay makes the case that as girls develop from childhood to adulthood
they repress certain Oedipal desires in ways quite different from boys.
What intrigued and delighted me about the essay on this reading was its
structure. He starts with a description of the neurotic patient whose psychic
health has been jeopardized by excess and, more importantly, disorder. For
Freud, the conundrum of adult obsessional neurosis is best addressed by a
kind of ordering and resolution brought about through psychoanalysis. The
neurotic patient has work left undone that should have been cleaned up at an
earlier stage of development.
Freud helps us understand the source of the problem here by telling us a
story, a story in three parts. In the non-neurotic child, he tells us, beating
fantasies are "normal," and they go, indeed should go, through three varia-
tions on the beating theme. In the first stage during early childhood, the girl
fantasizes that a child is being beaten but it is revealed that what is really
being represented is: "My father is beating the child," and the child is one
whom the girl dislikes.5 These fantasies are thus sadistic in nature. In the
second phase, in part induced by a sense of guilt about the first phase of the
beating fantasy, it transforms into "I am being beaten by my father," taking
on a more masochistic form in which the child experiences "a high degree of
pleasure."'6 The taboo nature of this pleasure results in its repression as the
child progresses to the third and final phase of the beating fantasies. Here a
male adult, not the girl's father-a teacher, perhaps-is beating one or more
other children, typically boys, and the girl having the fantasy is looking on.'
Freud tells us that the symbolic and libidinal structure of this third phase is
sadistic in form yet masochistic in satisfaction since the boys being beaten
are mere phantasmatic substitutes for the self.
This evolution of the female beating fantasy illuminates the "healthy"
resolution whereby the repression of the Oedipal fantasy serves to forestall
perversion and displace the shame that that perverse desire for the father
entails. The structure, indeed the narrative, resolves and averts future neuro-
sis by rendering orderly big, and ultimately inappropriate, feelings and
desires and channeling them into their proper phantasmatic homes. The
master narrative Freud provides cleans it all up by locating the emotionally
tumescent child in a genealogical grid in which she finds herself in a couple,
tied to her father. The family thus becomes a kind of affective container in
which feelings can be experienced non-neurotically.
I Id. at 222.
6 Id. at 223.
71d.
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In jurisprudential form, Freud finishes the essay by addressing and eas-
ily distinguishing and dismissing two competing accounts of child beating
fantasies, those of Fliess and Alfred Adler,8 almost as if addressing and dis-
missing arguments made in dissenting opinions.
The rightness of the master narrative offered by Freud in A Child is
Being Beaten has a kind of ordering effect similar to so many canonical legal
opinions. Take Palsgraf v. Long Island Railway,9 the torts case that any
lawyer will remember from the first year of law school. A package is
dropped by "two Italians" on a railway platform and explodes while Helen
Palsgraf stands feet away with her three children on their way to the beach
on a bright summer day. Mrs. Palsgraf is startled by the sound of scales that
are knocked to the ground by the explosion and suffers a kind of emotional
trauma-some might call it neurosis-resulting in a long term nervous
"stuttering and stammering."' 0 She sues the railroad for its negligent role in
causing the Italians to drop the exploding packages which caused her
injury."1
Mrs. Palsgraf sought treatment for her neurosis, but not from a psychia-
trist. After all, her accident occurred in August of 1924, just five years after
the publication of A Child is Being Beaten, and psychotherapy surely had not
taken hold in working class neighborhoods in Queens at that time. Instead
she consulted a physician who prescribed bromides and nerve tonics, which
did little to alleviate her symptoms. 2 Gaining no comfort from her doctors,
Mrs. Palsgraf turned to the law to address her neurotic injury. 3 For her, as
for many of Freud's patients, treatment in the form of testimony offered the
only viable alternative to failed tonics and bromides.
Palsgraf's story, like Freud's essay, starts with a neurotic patient/victim
who seeks help from an expert, an authority who will listen to her story and
who is able to alleviate the disorderliness of her affective life. Judge Benja-
min Cardozo, a pragmatist when it came to substance and a formalist when it
came to method, organized the chaos of the dispute before him by imposing
a master narrative, a structure on these facts that would lead to the right
result. Just as object relations theory provided a rational explanation of the
beating fantasies of Freud's female patients, a theory of proximate causation
lent the rational decisional structure that would produce the right result for
Cardozo in the Palsgraf case. Both theories did their work by resort to a
structure of relations: Oedipal relations for Freud and social relations
grounded in foreseeability of harm for Cardozo. Freud's phases of beating
8 Id. at 237-40.
9 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).10 Record on Appeal at 15-17, Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y.
1928), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/faculty-franke/CLT2009/PalsgrafRe-
cord.pdf (testimony of Dr. Karl A. Parshall).
" Id.
'2 1d.
1I Id. at 10-11 (testimony of Helen Palsgraf).
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fantasies recount the process by which the child locates herself (with the aid
of guilt and repression) in the right relation to the child being beaten, and
ipso facto, in the right affective relation to her father. Cardozo's notion of
foreseeability structures human fields of action in such a way that a rational
distinction can be drawn between people to whom we owe a duty of care and
mere others to whom we owe nothing.
To push the analogy between Freud'sA Child is Being Beaten and Car-
dozo's Palsgraf opinion even further may be more than it can bear, but I
found a certain familiar comfort in Freud's reasoning that shared an aesthetic
and methodological form with the reasoning in many canonical legal opin-
ions. The formalism of Freud's three phases, the structure of the psychoana-
lytic method, and the power of a master narrative that both explains and
organizes otherwise unruly facts, all echo the tools of a seasoned judge. But
more, both texts find resolution in the discovery of a relation, a diad, a sys-
tem that provides the context for ending the story successfully. For Freud it
is the Oedipal relation, for Cardozo it is the relation of duty flowing from
foreseeability. For both, the relation determines the terms of legibility of the
one to the other, and thereby launches a normative and affective world in
which we come to want and expect the right things of one another.
Then comes Eve Sedgwick, writing A Poem is Being Written as a coun-
terpoint to Freud'sA Child is Being.Beaten. The familiar comfort I exper-
ienced reading the Freud was completely upended reading the Sedgwick.
And so she intended. Rather than offering a linear narrative that seeks to
rationally organize and reveal an intact subject, she aims to keep the reader
and the narrative off balance. She begins with a poem, moves to exposition,
shifts temporal settings from the present to her childhood, and implicates the
reader in a struggle with misrecognition and legibility of the self. The essay
at once performs and discusses resistance to the repression Freud so prizes.
She succeeds, at times, in implicating the reader in the perverse, shameful,
and masochistic exploration of, among other things, the anus as site of sex-
ual desire and satisfaction, and the frank display of the fat female body.
Both Freud's and Sedgwick's essays represent a kind of testimonial
genre, but the speech acts they undertake are really quite different. Freud's
patients remake themselves by talking their way through a reckoning with
complex desires and taboos that produce an integrated, if not repressed, but
surely coherent sense of self. Sedgwick, by contrast, uses testimony to illu-
minate the absurdity and impossibility of the symbolic coherence Freud has
on offer. Her desires and traumas remain in a complex circuitry with one
another, and the self she projects is one that has several voices, resists a
stable location in familiar kinship grids, and seeks not to resolve but to come
to terms with the self-shattered subject. No wonder the lawyer in me felt so
disassembled and without sure footing in reading Sedgwick's brilliant essay.
In A Poem is Being Written, Sedgwick's celebration of perversion and
her effort to unearth the repressed offer an alternative, queer approach to the
disorderliness of a psychic life that Freud so neatly cleaned up in A Child is
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Being Beaten. Both seek to reveal a truth of the violence of the self and of
the family through their symbolic depiction. Freud through dreams,
Sedgwick through poetry. Yet these texts, read together, suggested to me
something else: alternative ways of mapping the civil rights strategies under-
taken by the lesbian and gay community for marriage equality over the last
several years.
I find echoes of Freud's A Child is Being Beaten in the briefs, oral
arguments, and advocacy of many of the same-sex marriage cases. There is
a way in which the lawyers, by choice and as a consequence of the structure
of litigation itself, find themselves narrating the injustice of being closed out
of the institution of marriage in such a way that figures affective life outside
of marriage as somehow traumatic, dare I say perverse, and in need of the
curative structure and discipline of the institution of the normative legal fam-
ily. In states such as California, 14 Connecticut, 5 and New Jersey 6 that have
enacted civil union statutes that afford same-sex couples the full spectrum of
legal rights enjoyed by married couples, the same-sex plaintiffs can no
longer posit material forms of harm as the basis of their cases. Instead they
must claim a symbolic dignity harm as the injury on which their lawsuit is
based. The story they tell sets up life outside marriage as shameful, and that
shame can only be satisfactorily addressed by and through the institution of
marriage.
While psychoanalysis amounts to a confrontation with the shame and
trauma of the now repressed child, same-sex marriage litigation does one
better. It makes that child a co-plaintiff in the lawsuit. In Varnum v. Brien, 17
the Iowa same-sex marriage case, three of the plaintiffs were children of the
"six committed, same-sex couples."' 8 Their injury, as set out in the com-
plaint, was that they sought "the dignity, legitimacy, protections, benefits,
support and security conferred on children whose parents are permitted to
marry." 9 The children of unmarried lesbian and gay couples "face a loss of
dignity and legitimacy, in their own eyes, the eyes of many others and under
law, from their parents not having the freedom to marry one another...
[They] will internalize the message that they receive from their government
that their family is not as worthy as other families. '20 For another adult
plaintiff, the complaint continues, "being able to marry [his partner] would
help others respect and accept their relationship instead of seeing something
wrong with it. [He] has known he was gay since at least 8th grade and
always has had a great sense of loss and feeling of being worth 'less than'
'" CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2006).
"5 CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-38aa-46b-38pp (2007).
6 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1-28(0 (West 2007).
.7 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
's Amended Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Supplemental Injunctive and
Mandamus Relief at 1, Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (D. Iowa 2009), available at
http://data.lambdalegal.org/pdf/legal/varnum/varnum-v-brien-petition- 102907.pdf.
191d. at 2.20 Id. at 5.
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others because of his lack of access to marriage."'" These sentences could
be uttered just as easily in therapy as they are in the opening lines of a
complaint initiating a lawsuit. Surely for some of the plaintiffs they have
been, and the turn to law takes up on the heels of the inadequacy of therapy
to remedy this emotional injury.
Marriage, for the plaintiffs in the Iowa same-sex marriage case, would
literally deliver a "make whole" remedy. If able to marry they would fi-
nally be made whole, be fully integrated, be cured of the stigma, the trauma,
the shame, the psychic injury of being unable to marry or being the shamed
children of parents trapped in the purgatory of a civil union.
Recall that Freud teaches us that the healthy resolution of the Oedipal
complex for the beaten female child is sadomasochistic in form, yet maso-
chistic in satisfaction. Yet, in a way, can't the same be said of the same-sex
marriage litigation? To some degree, the delight gained from a success in
this kind of litigation comes from having an authority figure, the Supreme
Court of Iowa, discipline the bigoted legislators who were refusing to extend
the marriage laws to deserving same-sex couples. On a deeper level, in their
testimonial confession to a dignity-deprived sense of low self esteem, these
cases represent a profound form of self hatred and judgment about the per-
version and shame of a sexual and intimate life outside of marriage. The
masochistic impulse that undergirds the legal posture taken in these cases is
troublesome to many of us who identify more with the kinds of desire and
relation that are made possible outside of the governance of the state and the
institution of marriage. But the plaintiffs in these cases, along with their
lawyers, purport to speak for all of "us" in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
queer communities when they testify to these injuries and pray, as we say in
the law, for relief from their suffering.
Of course, the "gay rights" movement began with drag queens and sex
radicals at Stonewall joining forces with radical lesbian feminists chanting
"keep your laws off my body" and dreaming of a place called "Herland,"
all seeking to overturn a kind of heterosexist sexual moralism operational-
ized, but not exclusively, through the state. We now see the movement em-
bracing that sexual moralism as the basis of a civil rights strategy and
demanding, no, begging, that its members be regulated and disciplined by
the legal and moral structure of the normative institution of marriage. I
won't rehearse here the fuller elaboration of my critique of these politics, as I
have done so elsewhere. 2  For present purposes I have a different question
I'd like to pose.
What if, rather than reproducing a Freudian resolution of sexual perver-
sion in our civil rights strategy, we explored something more sympathetic to
21 Id. at 6.
22 Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM.
L. REV. 1399 (2004); Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics,
15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236 (2006); Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76
FORDHAM L. REV.2685 (2008).
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the road down which Eve Sedgwick traveled? That is, what would it mean
to undertake a self-consciously queer conception of civil rights? Not one
that represses the perverse, but rather embraces it and makes room for it.
Sedgwick's A Poem is Being Written refuses to organize her desires into
social identities, refuses to house her desires in gendered body parts, and
refuses to speak in a single voice that would render her an adequate class
representative even for herself.
This is the legacy Eve Sedgwick has left us: the tools for thinking
through what it might mean to have a perverse civil rights strategy. Like
Sedgwick herself, it will resist the inclination to organize our desires and
forms of attachment into familiar genders or social identities, and even less
so in conformance with the demands of familiar and respectable kinship
grids. And it certainly will not sit in judgment of those who don't shy away
from the pleasure and the danger to be found in the domain of shame, dis-
gust, and injury. Can law handle the disorderliness of this civil rights sub-
ject? More importantly, can we?
